PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
*In Herman v. Metropolitan

St. Ry Co., 121 Fed. 184,
the United States Circuit Court. (S. D., New York) holds
that where, in an action for injuries the plainLien of
tiff's attorney served notice of a lien for his
Attorney,

compensation, and the plaintiff settled the case
with the defendant before trial, without the
attorney's consent, whereupon the attorney continued the
Contingent
Foes

prosecution for his fees, and a verdict was rendered assessing the plaintiff's damages at $500, the attorney was entitled to recover from such amount the reasonable value of
his services actually rendered, whereupon the balance of the
recovery would be remitted. But a contract between the
plaintiff and his attorney by which the plaintiff agreed to
pay the attorney 50 per cent of any recovery for injuries to
the plaintiff, and in addition to pay all the disbursements,
was, it is held, unconscionable and void. See Matter of
Fitzsimons, 79 N. Y. Supp. 194.
BANKRUPTCY.

A creditor holding a check given by his debtor, who
transfers the same to a bank by indorsement, remains a
Preferences,
Independent
Debts

creditor, within the meaning of the bankruptcy

act, and the payment of the check to the bank
after the debtor's insolvency, and within four

months prior to his bankruptcy, constitutes a preferential
transfer of property to the indorser, under section 6oa of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898: United States Circuit Court of
Appeals (Second Circuit) In re Lyon, 121 Fed. 723., The
court further holds that where at the time a bankrupt
became insolvent he owed a creditor a balance of account
accruing prior to November, for which he had given a post
dated check, and also an account accruing in December, the
payment of the check thereafter constituted a preference,
which affected the entire indebtedness, and not the payment
552
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of an independent debt, and that it -must be surrendered to
entitle the creditor to prove his account. See Swarts v.
Siegel, I 17 Fed. 13.
BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.

Provision in the application and certificate of a member
of a beneficial association that he accepts the certificate
subject to all future laws of the association,
Subsequent
renders binding on him only after-adopted laws
By-Laws
for the conduct of the association, duties of members, and
the like, and not such as impair his contract of insurance:
Campbell v. American Ben. Club Fraternity (Mo.) 73 S.
W. 342. See Morton v. Supreme Council of the Royal
League (Mo.) 73 S. W. 259.
CARRIERS.

In Herf & Frerichs Chemical Co. v. Lackawanna Line
(Mo.), 73 S. W. 346, it is held that though under the law
of the state a carrier may not be required to
Duty to
notify the consignee of the arrival of goods, yet
Notify
where the uniformly observed usage of the place
Consignee
to which goods are shipped requires the carrier to notify the
consignee of the arrival of the shipment, such usage will be
binding on the carrier unless its observance is dispensed with
by an express stipulation to that effect in the contract of shipment; and further such local usage is not dispensed with by
a stipulation in the contract of shipment that the goods are
to be called for on the day of their arrival. See Chemical
Co. v. LackawannaLine, 70 Mo. App. 282.

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

In Chisolm v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397, the United States
Circuit Court (D. South Carolina) holds that a person may
be guilty of a contempt of court in doing an act
Acts
Consttuting which he knows the court has prohibited by
injunction-as by wilfully trespassing on lands, with
knowledge that the court had adjudged them to be private
property, and had enjoined the defendants in the suit, and
"all persons whomsoever," from trespassing thereon-although he was not a party to the suit, and is neither the
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agent or servant of, nor in privity with, any of the parties.
In such case he is not technically guilty of a violation of the
injunction, but of an independent act of disrespect to the
court, and disregard of its decree, which constitutes a contempt of the court, and may be punished as such without
reference to its effect upon the rights of the suitors. See
In re Lennon, I66 U. S. 554.

CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Davis & Co. v.
Morgan, 43 S. E. 732, that where a contract of employgp.ym..
ment is made for one year at a stipulated salary
Alteration, per month, an agreement during the term to
Consideration

receive less or to pay more than the contract

price is void, unless supported by some change in place,
hours, character of employment or other consideration. See
in connection with this case Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489.

CORPORATIONS.'

Where, on the organization of a corporation by mutual
agreement, full-paid stock was issued to the incorporators
tyment for
Stock in
Property

in payment for property transferred by them to
the corporation, one of the incorporators who
participated in such agreement, and who after-

ward became a creditor of the corporation, cannot assert its
invalidity for the purpose of holding the other stockholders
liable on the ground that the property was not in fact equal
in value to the par value of the stock: U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals in Cunningham v. Holley, Mason, Marks & Co.,
121 Fed. 720.
A court which has appointed receivers for a corporation
as an insolvent will not direct them to bring suits to ascertain and enforce the liability of promoters,
..,,
salt against officers and directors of the corporation for the
Promoters benefit of creditors, until its visible assets have
been liquidated and the fact and amount of deficiency is
ascertained: United States Circuit Court (D. New Jersey)
in Land TitLe & Trust Co. v. Asphalt Co. of America, 121
Fed. 587.
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The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas holds in Daulton v. State, 73 S. W. 395, that where affidavits show that,
Mtodct
after the jury in a criminal prosecution had
of Jury
retired, and before they had agreed on a ver,dict, they discussed the failure of the defendant to testify,
their verdict of guilty will be set aside, notwithstanding
affidavits of the jurors stating that the discussion did not
influence their conclusion. See Buessing v. State (Tex. Cr.
App.), 63 S. W. 318.
DANGEROUS PREMISES.

. In O'Connor v. Bencker, 43 S. E. 731, the Supreme Court
of Georgia holds that the principle of the turntable cases
will not be extended, and where the door of a
Children
vacant house is left open, and a young child
playing therein is injured by the fall of a window which was
being raised by his companion, the owner will not be liable
therefor: See S. F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Beavers, 113 Ga. 398.

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.

The Florida statute authorizes actions for death by
wrongful act, and provides that such an action may be
Conflict of

brought by the widow, surviving husband,

minor child, person -dependent for support, or
the executor or administrator. In applying this statute the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals holds that an administratrix, appointed in Alabama of a deceased resident of
that state may sue in Florida for negligence causing the
death of her intestate, though the statutes of the two states
relative to the distribution of damages in such cases are
dissimilar. The Florida statute, it is held, governs distribution in Alabama: Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Sullivan,
12o Fed. 799. Compare Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S.
11-21, and Stewart v. Baltimore, 168 U. S. 445.
LawS

DEED.

In Letson v. Letson, 8o N. Y. Supp. 1032, the New York
Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department)
Aton to

holds that where a father, during his life-time,

executed a deed on his land to one of his sons,
-which deed the son obtained possession of in an unlawful
Set Aside
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manner after the father's death, and placed on record, and
thereupon a brother, claiming a one-fourth interest in the
land as heir of the deceased, brought an action to have the
deed set aside and the record thereof cancelled, a court of
equity has jurisdiction to grant the relief asked, even though
the one bringing the action is not in possession of the premises. See Howarth v. Howarth, 73 N. Y. Supp. 785, and
Moores v. Townshend, 1O2 N. Y. 387.

EQUITY PRACTICE.

The United States Circuit Court (D. Rhode Island) holds
in Tillinghast v. Chace, 121 Fed. 435, that upon a bill in
equity which waives an oath to the answer, the
waiver of
complainant cannot have discovery. "The comoath,
plainant contends that the waiver of an oath does
Discovery
not deprive the complainant of his right to a full answer
and a full discovery from the defendants. This contention
finds some slight support in Bates on Federal Equity Procedure, Vol I, § 355, and cases cited.

.

.

. But there is

presented no decision of the Supreme Court or of any circuit court of appeals, for this position; and it seems contrary to principle."
EVIDENCE.

In an action for personal injuries it is error to allow
counsel to read from a medical book a statement as to the
symptoms of a certain disease, and to ask the
Medical
Works
plaintiff's physician if he subscribes thereto:
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third Department) in Pahl v. Troy City Ry. Co., 81 N. Y. Supp.
46. See also City of Blo'omington v. Shrock, i1O Ills.
219.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in State v.
Milarn, 43 S. E. 677, that where, at a second trial of two
Evidence at defendants for crime, a witness for one of the
Former Trial defendants, who had formerly been tried alone,
is dead, his former evidence is competent at the second trial
in behalf of such defendant, although his co-defendant, then
on trial, objects to the same. See State v. Dodson, IO S. C.
453.
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

In Van v. Pacific Coast .Co., 12o Fed. 699, the United
States Circuit Court (D. Washington, N. D.) holds that it
is not unlawful for a police officer to arrest and
Arrt
without
detain a person at the request of one on whom
Wan-ant
the officer has a right to rely, and while the
person arrested was in the commission of an act supposed
to be criminal, although it was technically not so, and such
an arrest will not support an action for false imprisonment
against the person causing it. "Any innocent person is
liable to be subjected to detention while circumstances of
an apparently criminating character are being investigated."
See in connection herewith, Filerv. Smith, 96 Mich. 351.

FOREIGN CORPORATION.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth
Circuit) holds in Blodgett v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 12o Fed.
Prohibition to 893, that the prohibition by a state of the mainMaintain
tenance of actions in its courts by a foreign corActions
poration does not prohibit or limit the right of
that corporation to maintain such actions in the national
courts, nor does it forbid the corporation from defending
actions in the state courts. "The jurisdiction of the federal
courts was not conferred, and it-cannot be withdrawn or
limited by the legislation of the states. It was granted by
the people through the Constitution and the acts of Congress,
and an amendment of the Constitution, or an act of Congress, is requisite to destroy or diminish it." See National
.Surety Co. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 12o Fed. 593.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

An attorney who has rendered services to a wife seeking
a separation and support from her husband may, on the
Ncesi,, death of the husband, maintain an action against
Attorney's the executors to recover on the ground that the
ef,
services were a "necessary" to the wife: New
York Supreme Court (Special Term, Jefferson County) in
Kellogg v. Stoddard, 8i N. Y. Supp. 271. See Naumer v.
Gray, 51 N. Y. Supp. 222.
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Where a labor organization maliciously induced persons
contracting with the plaintiff to violate their contracts,
Labor
and threatened to continue to do the same in the
Unions,
future, and caused a strike of all plaintiff's
Stakes
workmen engaged on two different pieces of
work which plaintiff had contracted to do, merely because
the plaintiff refused to recognize the walking delegate of the
union or to recognize "the union in any way," the plaintiff
was entitled to an injunction to restrain the continuance of
such acts: New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
First Department) in Beattie v. Callanan, 8i N. Y. Supp.
413. Compare National Protective Association v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 315.
INNKEEPERS.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) holds
in Hoffman v. Roessle, 8i N. Y. Supp. 291, that where a
Ca.
hotel proprietor, who was liable only as a graRequired:
tuitous bailee for the care of plaintiff's baggage,
Negligence
during plaintiff's absence, delivered the plaintiff's valise to a person presenting a forged order therefor,
which person was known to the clerk in the hotel office
and had dined with the plaintiff on a number of occasions,
and had been frequently seen with him about the hotel, such
proprietor was not guilty of such gross negligence as rendered him liable for the loss of the baggage, though he had
not seen the plaintiff's signature, and did not obtain it from
the register. One judge dissents. Compare Hays v. Turner,
23

Iowa,

214.

INSURANCE.

The United States Circuit Court (E. D., Pennsylvania)
holds in Black v. Supreme Council American Legion of
Benefit
Honor, 12o Fed. 58o, that where a fraternal
Associations

benefit association or order is incorporated, and

empowered to make insurance contracts with- its members,
such contracts are made by it as a legal entity; and in all
action for breach of such a contract the internal affairs of
the corporation and the equities of its members inter sese
are matters which are immaterial and which cannot affect
its liability.
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In United States v. Lackey, 12o Fed. 577, it appeared
that a licensed liquor dealer received orders from customers
Place ot
living in a place where he was not authorized
s~e
to sell. He filled such orders by separating the
liquor from the stock in his place of business, and delivering
the packages, marked with the customers' names, to a private
carrier, to be carried to the customers, and to be delivered at
their place of residence, on payment of the price. Under
these facts the United States District Court (W. D., Virginia) holds that the sales were completed in the seller's
place of business, where he was licensed to sell, and hence
the carrier was not liable for retailing liquor without a
license. "An order for goods to be shipped 'collect on
delivery' makes payment a condition precedent or concurrent with the delivery to the purchaser, but it does not necessarily make payment a condition precedent to the transfer
of title." See 21 Am. and Eng. Ency. (Ist Ed.), 511-512.
LICENSEE.

Lytle v. James (Mo.), 73 S. W. 287, decides that one
having a right as licensee by contract to remove ore from
land for a certain time, revocable only for failInlunction
against
ure to comply with certain rules and regulations,
T're
having no remedy at law against a trespasser,
may have an injunction against him. Compare Rochester
v. Gate City Mining Co., 86 Mo. App. 447, and Arnold v.
Bennett, 92 Mo. App. 156. This latter case held that in
such case the plaintiff has no right to bring trespass.
NEGLIGENCE.

In Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 12o Fed.
865, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth
Circuit) makes an excellent review of the law
Uabmllty of
bearing upon the question of the liability of a
Vendor.,etc,
manufacturer, vendor or contractor for injuries
to Third
Parties
to a third person, and it is held that the general
rule is that such manufacturer, etc., is not liable to third
parties who have no contractual relations with him for
negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of the
articles he handles. But as an exception to this rule the
court holds that a manufacturer or vendor, who, without
giving notice of its character or qualities, supplies or delivers to another a machine or article, which, at the time of
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delivery, he knows to be imminently dangerous to the life
or limbs of any one who may use it for the purpose for
which it is intended, is liable to aihy one who sustains injury
from its dangerous condition, whether he has any contractual relations with him or not.. The case contains a valuable
collection of authorities. See Winterbottom v. Wright, IO
M. & W. 109.
NONSUIT.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Bangs v.
Sullivan, 73 S. W. 74, that the fact that one of the members
of a reorganization committee refused to join
Reorganiz.
tion
with the rest in taking a nonsuit could not deCormmtt.e
prive the committee of their right to take it,
where the agreement between the stockholders and the committee expressly provided that the power conferred on the
committee, which included authority to institute, prosecute,
compromise and dismiss suits, might at any time be exercised by a majority of its members.
PARTIES.

To a suit by a taxpayer against a city to enjoin it from
creating a debt beyond the constitutional limit, by carrying
suit to
out a contract made with a person or corporaEnjoin Tax
tion, such person or corporation is not an indispensable party defendant: United States Circuit Court (S.
D., Iowa) in City Water Supply Co. v. City of Ottumwa,
12o Fed. 3o9. As to cases cited in opposition to this holding, among others the case of Minnesota v. NorthernSecurities Co., 184 U. S. 199, the court says: "They are not in
point for the reason that those were cases .wherein contracts
and relations between the named defendants were the principal thing sought to be canceled or controlled by decree. In
the case at bar the principal thing to be corrected and enjoined by decree is the creation of the alleged invalid indebtedness."
PARTNERSHIP.

With two judges dissenting the New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, First Department) holds in
Dissolution,
Smith v. Proskey, 8I N. Y. Supp. 424, that
Assets
where an agreement between partners provided
for the dissolution of the partnership, appointed one of the
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partners liquidator, and provided that all assets of the firm
should "vest" in the liquidating partner, the agreement did
not give the liquidator absolute title, and hence on his death
they did not descend to his administratrix. See Gilmore v.
Ham, 142 N. Y. i.

By the terms of a dissolution contract, B., a member of
a mercantile firm, was to continue the business, collect outstanding indebtedness, and assume and pay all
Diolution:
Assumption
indebtedness owing by it. Prior to the dissoluof Liablities tion, the firm sold certain logs to a lumber company warranting title thereto. Subsequent to the dissolution, on failure of title to part of the logs, the lumber company recovered judgment on account thereof against the
members of the firm. No claim was made by the company
at the time the firm dissolved. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds in Dorwin v. Laughlin, 94 N. W. 641, that
this was not one of the liabilities assumed by B.
PERSONAL INJURIES.

In an action for injuries the trial court has no authority
to compel the plaintiff to submit to an examination by phyCompulsory
sicians to be appointed by the court: Court of
Examiuntion Civil Appeals of Texas in Austin & N. W. R.
Co. v. Cluck, 73 S. W. 569. See Railway Co. v. Batsford,
141 U. S. 253.

PENAL STATUTE.

A penal act of Congress cannot be sustained, as an exercise of the power given by a constitutional provision to
Comdructon enact appropriate legislation for its enforcement,
where the act is broader in its terms than the
constitutional provision, and the language used covers
wrongful acts without as well as within the same. In such
case the courts cannot limit the act by construction, and
bring it within the constitutionai grant of power: United
States Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) in Karem
v. United States, 121 Fed. 25o. The case deals with the
permissibility of Congressional legislation to secure to
negroes the right of suffrage and contains a very good
review of the subject. See U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.
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In Thompson v. New South Coal Co., 34 Southern, 31,
the Supreme Court of Alabama holds that when a contract
for the sale of land is shown by the bill for a
Oral iand
Contrcts
specific performance to be obnoxious to the statute of frauds, the more appropriate mode of taking advantage of this is by demurrer. See Boiling v. Munchus, 65
Ala. 558. In such case a cheque given for part of the
price and containing the words, "part payment on coal
lands," is, it is held, not a sufficient memorandum, since the
description of the land is not adequate. Compare Nelson
v. Shelly Mfg. & Imp. Co., 96 Ala' 515.

POSSESSION.

In Reed v. Hackney, 54 Atl. 229, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, adopting the rule that when a widow after the
death of her husband remains in possession of
Dower
interest
lands of which he died seised, or to which she
has not released her right of dower, it is in law presumed
to be her possession, in right of her dower until dower is
assigned, holds that if the husband in his lifetime has conveyed the land by a deed, in which his wife did not join,
anti she, after the first husband's death, marries the grantee,
who lives with her upon the premises, the possession is the
possession of the wife until her dower is assigned, and not
the possession of the husband.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Glanz v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 93 N. W. 575, that negligence of a
Injury
railroad company in starting fire on the plainSustainedlIn

Extinguishing

Fre

tiff's premises would be the proximate cause of
injury to his health by overexertion in putting it
out.

The general principle is adopted that "one
who, acting with reasonable prudence, voluntarily exposes
himself to danger for the purpose of protecting his property,
may recover for the consequent injuries he receives from the
person whose wrong caused the injury to himself, and thedanger to the property he sought to protect."
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The Supreme Court of Missouri holds in State ex rel.
Crow v. City of St. Louis, 73 S. W. 623, that where a policeman, pursuant to orders, and in discharge of
Relimbursement for
his duty to prevent and remove nuisances in the
Expense
streets, shoots at a mad steer in the street, but,
though using due care, hits a child, for which judgment is
recovered against him, the city may reimburse him, in the
absence of provisions to the contrary. Compare Cullen v.
Carthage, 103 Ind. 196.
RAILROADS.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh
Circuit) holds in Donovan et al. v. Pennsylvania Co., 120
Fed. 215, that a railroad company is under no
stations:
Use by
duty as a common carrier to permit hackmen to
lffckmen
enter its stations for the purpose of soliciting
business from its passengers, and therefore its granting of
such right to one person or concern does not entitle others
to equal privileges on the same terms, and the railroad company has such a property right to a free and unobstructed
entrance to its stations for its passengers and employes,
that it is entitled to protection in such right by an injunction
to restrain hackmen from continuously congregating upon
the sidewalk around the doors of a station for the purpose of
soliciting business, in such numbers as to interfere with
ingress and egress; but such an injunction should go no
further than is necessary to protect complainant's private
right of property, leaving any obstruction to the use of the
street or walk by the public generally to be dealt with by the
municipality. See and compare Barker v. Midland Ry. Co.,
18 C. B. 46; Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, etc., Co.,. 54 Atl. 785, that
Pledge of
where a railroad company deposits with a trusStock
tee, under a written agreement, stock of another
railroad company, reserving to itself all the rights, powers
and privileges appertaining to the ownership of the stock,
including the right to vote it, the railroad company can exact
from the trustee a proxy in order to vote the stock for a
merger of the railroad company, whose stock is deposited
with another company, as authorized by law, though the
trustee will be compelled to receive back, instead of stock
in the original company, stock in the consolidated company.
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The Supreme Court of the United States holds in Prout
v. Starr, 23 S. C. R. 398, that a suit against the Nebraska
board of transportation for the purpose of preSuit
Agaist
venting the enforcement of the Nebraska act
State
fixing maximum railroad rates, on the ground
of the invalidity of such statute under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, is not a suit against the state
within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Compare Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.
S. 516.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

In Hoye v. Great Northern Ry. Co., I2O Fed. 712, the
United States Circuit Court (D. Montana) holds that
when, by agreement between railroad companies
Connecting
Rai
.ads: owning connecting lines, cars are transferred
-Separble
from one road to the other, both companies owe
Contmveny
the duty to employes of the receiving company to exercise reasonable care to see that such cars are in
proper repair; and where such an employe is injured by
reason of a defect which existed when a car was so transferred, he may join both companies as defendants in an
action for the injury. Further an action to. recover for a
personal injury alleged to have resulted from the concurring
negligence of two defendants, each of whom owed a separate
duty of care to the plaintiff, is not removable by one defendant, who is a non-resident of the state, on the ground that
it involves a separable controversy. See in this connection
notes to Rabbins v. Ellenbogen, 18 C. C. A. 86; Mecke v.
Valleytoum Mineral Co., 35 C. C. A. I55.
RESULTING TRUSTS.

Generally, where the purchase money of land is paid by
one person, and the conveyance is taken in the name of
Aft.s.m.nts another, the party taking the title is presumed to
Prpno-

hold the estate in trust for him who pays the

purchase price. But where the conveyance runs to one for
whom the purchaser is under a legal or.moral obligation to
provide, the presumption arises that the conveyance was
intended as an advancement to the nominal purchaser: Supreme Court of Nebraska in Bailey v. Dobbins, 93 N. W.
687.
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ROBBERY.

Where a purse, secured by a steel chain wrapped around
the owner's finger, is suddenly snatched by one intending to
steal the same, and the force used is sufficient

to break the chain and injure the owner's finger,
tho offence is robbery, and not larceny from the person:
Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. State, 43 S. E. 736.
Compare Rex v. Mason, i Leach C. C. 418.
Evidence

SPIECIFIC PMRFORMANCE.

"The early equity doctrine that, if the right to specific
performance of a contract exists at all, it must be mutual,
Want of
was based largely upon notions of expediency,
Mutuality
rather than upon any principle of abstract justice, and has been materially modified. The doctrine of this
court is that, if a contract for the conveyance of real estate
is supported by a valid consideration, and there is no other
good reason why it should not be specifically enforced, except the want of mutuality of the remedy, it will be so enforced": Supreme Court of Minnesota in Lamprey v. St..
Paul & C. Ry. Co., 94 N. W. 555. Compare Austin v.
Wacks, 30 Minn. 335.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Bethel v. A.
Booth & Co., 72 S. W. 803, that though a contract to give
Implied
employment for ten years is void under the
Contract

statute of frauds, so that action will not lie for

its breach, notwithstanding the employe has performed part
of it, yet, in consideration thereof, the employe having sold
the employer a business for less than its value, he may on
an implied promise, recover the difference between the
amount paid for and the value of the business. See Montague v. Garnett, 3 Bush, 298.
STOCKBROKRS.

In Tuell v. Paine, 81 N. Y. Supp. 956, the New York
Supreme Court (Special Term, New York City) holds that
Sales on
where a stockbroker, being ordered to buy cernrgfn
tain stocks, buys them on a margin, he cannot
sell out the stocks when the margin is exhausted, unless
the customer waives tender of them, demand of payment
of balances due, and notice of the broker's intent to sell.
See Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480.
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Where at the time of a collision between a street car and
a vehicle the motorman was running the car at a rate of
speed prohibited by a city ordinance, the deNegligence
fendant was guilty of negligence per se: Meyers
v. St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo.), 73 S. W. 379.
TAXATION.

In Blackstone v. Miller, 23 S. C. R. 277, the Supreme
Court of the United States, holds that a state may tax the
Succeslon

transfer, under the will of a non-resident, of

debts due the decedent by its citizens. It makes
no difference that the whole estate is taxable in the state
where the owner has died. The case is distinguished from
the State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, because: "The taxation in that case was on the interest on
bonds held out of the state. Bonds and negotiable instruments are more than merely evidences of debt. The debt
is inseparable from the paper which declares and constitutes
it, by a tradition which comes down from more archaic
Tax

conditions.

.

.

.

Therefore, considering only the place

of the property, it was held that bonds held out of the state
could not be reached. The decision has been cut down to its
precise point by later cases." , In the case in hand the "property" consisted of a debt due to the deceased by a firm, and
of a certain sum held on a deposit account by a New York
trust company. Mr. Justice White dissents from the decision rendered.
The Supreme Court of the United States holds in Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth of KenDeprivation of tucky, 23 S.C. R. 463, that a Kefitucky corporaProperty
tion operating a ferry across the Ohio River is
deprived of its property without due process of law by the
action of that state in including, for purposes of taxation, in
the valuation of the franchise derived by the corporation
from Kentucky, the value of an Indiana franchise for a
ferry from the Indiana to the Kentucky shore, which such
corporation had acquired. Two justices dissent.
In Swarts v. Hammer, 12o Fed. 256, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) holds that propEBnkrupt',s erty of a bankrupt in the hands of the trustee
Property

in bankruptcy is subject to taxation.

tion from taxation is never presumed.

"Exemp-

The legislative in-
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tent to exempt property from taxation must be clearly and
explicitly expressed. Whether Congress could rightfully
exempt from state taxation the property of a bankrupt in the
hands of a trustee in bankruptcy, and otherwise subject to
taxation, we need not inquire. It has not attempted to do
so and it is highly probable it never will. . .
It is a
grave mistake to suppose that property in the possession
and custody of an officer of the federal court by that single
act enjoys immunity from taxation."
The Court of Appeals of Maryland holds in Baltimore
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 54 Atl. 623,
Oovernment

that where property belonging to the United

States was conveyed to A. for the purpose of
constructing a dry dock thereon to be subject to the use of
the United States without charge, the grantee was not entitled to exemption from state taxation on its interest in the
land and improvements thereon, on the ground that the
grantee was an agency of the Government. See Thomson v. Union Pac.R. Co., 9 Wall. 579.
Agencies

TI K S.
In Norman v. Southern Ry. Co., 44 S. E. 85, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina holds that where a passenger pays
Limitations
full fare for a general ticket, he is not bound by

Thereon
limitations printed thereon, where his attention
has not been called to them, and the posting of notices in
the waiting rooms and ticket offices is not sufficient to charge
him with notice thereof. "While there may be some uncertainty, and even conflict, in the authorities, we are of the
opinion that the correct rule is that a person who purchases
a general ticket, and pays the usual price therefor, is entitled to one passage, unlimited as to time, upon any train
which, under the proper and usual schedule of the road,
stops at the point of the passenger's destination. If a ticket,
limited or conditional, is sold to a passenger, it can only be
done upon an express agreement with him, either oral or in
writing, and either based upon a consideration or with the
alternative presented to the passenger of a full and unlimited ticket": Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Turner, 47 S. W.
223 (Tenn.).
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TRUSThES.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds In re Maitland, 8i N. Y. Supp. i9,that
improper
a trustee's account being surcharged with the
In-t-ont, amount of his investment in a mortgage, as
being .an improper investment, he should, on making the
trust fund good, be permitted to transfer to himself personally all rights and rights of action in respect thereto.
TRUSTS.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds In re Opening of One Hundred and
Authority
Tenth Street, 81 N. Y. Supp. 32, that where a
of Trustee,
will provides that the trustees thereunder shall
hold the property, and pay the income to the testator's
widow for life, and on her death divide the estate into equal
parts, and hold the same for the benefit of the children, on
the death of the widow a new and different trust estate
comes into existence, and though the trustees in one clause
of the will were given a general power to lease the property,
yet they had no authority to make a lease of the property
for a term longer than the first trust, where some of the
children's shares were, to be paid upon her death. The
court further holds that the lease is valid so long as the
widow lives.
The interesting question of what are the constituent elements of a constructive trust is involved in the case of Trice
Constructive v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620, decided by the
Trust
United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth
Circuit). It is held that wherever one person is placed in
such a relation to another by the act or consent of that
other, or by the act of a third person, or of the law, that he
becomes interested for him, or interested with him, in any
subject of property or business, he is in such fiduciary relation with him that he is prohibited from acquiring rights
in that subject antagonistic to the person with whose interests he has become associated. A violation of this inhibition,
and the acquisition by one of the parties by means of interest
or information acquired through the fiduciary relation of
any property or interest, which prevents or hinders his correlate in accomplishing the object of the agency, charges
the property thus acquired with a constructive trust for the
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benefit of the latter, which may be enforced or renounced
by him, at his option. Neither a legal nor equitable interest
by either party, during the relation, in the property subsequently acquired, nor authority in either to buy or sell it,
nor damage to the party betrayed, nor the existence of the
fiduciary relation at the time the confidence is abused, is
indispensable to the existence and enforcement of the trust.
The existence of the relation, and a subsequent abuse of the
confidence bestowed under it for the purpose of acquiring
the property, are alone sufficient to authorize the enforcement of the trust. See EoGf v. Irvine, Io8 Mo. 378.

WAT R COURSS.

Where a stream which forms the boundary between two
landowners frequently overflows and inundates portions of
Obsttuctlas the land on both sides, but more easily overflows
the land of one of them, equity will enjoin the
latter from filling in the low places on his land, and constructing a levee along the stream on his side, so as to cause
the stream unnaturally to overflow the lands of the other:
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Sullivan v. Dooley, 73
S. W. 82. The case contains a good discussion of the authorities. See in this connection O'Connell v. Railway, 13
S. E. 489.
B. was the owner of the south half of a section of land
between which and the river there was originally a strip of
eight acres, forming the fractional north half,
Riparlan
Rights:
which had not been patented. The river changed
Accreton
its bed until it had washed away the eight-acre
strip, and flowed through B.'s land, when it began to rebuild
to B.'s land all that it had washed away and about two hundred acres additional. A. then received a patent for the
fractional north half of the section as described by the
original survey. In Widdecombe v. Chiles, 73 S. W. 444,
the Supreme Court of Missouri lfolds, under these facts, that
the accretion being to B.'s land, A. took no title by his patent.
See Naylor v. Cox, 114 Mo. 232.

